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THE PUYALLUP INDIANS AND THE
RESERVATION DISESTABLISHMENT TEST
It was early recognized that Congress has the authority unilaterally
to disestablish all or any part of an Indian reservation.' The mere
opening of a reservation for settlement by non-Indians does not by it-
self demonstrate a congressional intent to terminate the reservation
status of the land.2 The circumstances surrounding the opening, how-
ever, may evidence such an intent.3 Therefore, when Congress opens
a reservation for settlement by non-Indians without expressly stating
the intended effect on the reservation status of the land, it is unclear
whether Congress has exercised its disestablishment power. It is such
an absence of congressional direction that makes the existence of the
Puyallup Indian Reservation uncertain.
The determination of whether the territory retains its reservation
status is important because it establishes which laws govern the land.4
Traditionally, federal and tribal laws govern the area inside reserva-
tions, and state laws govern the area outside them.5 Thus, a finding
I. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). The proposition that Congress can
unilaterally disestablish an Indian reservation was recently reaffirmed in Rosebud
Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
2. Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962). See notes 35-39 and accompa-
nying text infra.
3. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977). See notes 52-59 and ac-
companying text infra.
4. The determination of reservation status does not affect the ownership of the land.
The Puyallup Indian Reservation was allotted in 1872 and federal government patents
were issued in 1886. See note 18 and accompanying text infra. The present owners of
the land hold title by virtue of these patents. See Ross v. Eells, 56 F. 855 (C.C.D. Wash.
1893). The validity of these patents has never been disputed.
5. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (the state has no jurisdic-
tion within an Indian reservation).
The significance of the reservation boundary as a limit on state jurisdiction over
criminal offenses and civil causes of action between Indians was diminished for some
reservations in 1953 by the passage of Public Law 280, Act of August 15, 1953, Pub. L.
No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified in part as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1976), 28
U.S.C. § 1360 (1976)), which gave five states (California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Ore-
gon, and Wisconsin) general criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian reservations
within their boundaries. Congress also gave its consent for "any other state. . . to as-
sume jurisdiction" over the reservations within its boundaries by the passage of "affir-
mative legislative action." Id. § 7. Public Law 280 was amended in 1968 with the pas-
sage of the Indian Civil Rights Act, which made tribal consent a requisite for any future
assumption of jurisdiction by the states. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-284, § 401, 82 Stat. 73 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1321 (1976)).
Under the authority granted in Public Law 280, Washington has assumed partial civil
and criminal jurisdiction over the Puyallup Indian Reservation, as well as over the other
653
Washington Law Review
that land retains its reservation status will affect a tribe's ability to
tax,6 zone,7 and manage its internal affairs.8 In the case of the Puyal-
lup Indian Reservation, a finding that the reservation continues to ex-
ist would mean that approximately one-fifth of the city of Tacoma,
Washington, is within the reservation 9 and therefore subject to federal
and tribal jurisdiction. This could have a significant impact upon the
city's tax base, comprehensive zoning plan, and bonding capacity.' 0
This comment considers whether the Puyallup Indian Reservation
was disestablished when it was opened near the turn of the century for
settlement by non-Indians. Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has held that "the Puyallup Indian Reservation continues to ex-
ist,"" subsequent dictum of the United States Supreme Court casts
doubt upon the continuing validity of this holding.1 2 The question of
Indian reservations within its borders. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 37.12 (1976). However, the
reservation status of the land will still have a significant impact on disputes involving
encumbrances of land and interference with treaty rights. See generally Canby, Civil
Jurisdiction and the Indian Reservations, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 206, 211.
6. See, e.g., McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (state cannot
tax income earned by a tribe member from reservation sources); Iron Crow v. Oglala
Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956) (tribe can tax a tribe member); Buster v.
Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 599 (1906) (tribe can tax
a non-Indian on the reservation); Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation v.
Washington, 446 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D. Wash. 1978) (tribal cigarette tax preempted state
tax as applied to sales by Indians on a reservation).
7. See, e.g., Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977) (county is without jurisdiction to enforce its
zoning ordinance or building code on Indian reservation trust lands). See also Com-
ment, Jurisdiction to Zone Indian Reservations, 53 WASH. L. REV. 677 (1978).
8. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65-66 (1978) (tribe has civil juris-
diction over Indians and non-Indians on the reservation); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S.
217, 220 (1959) (recognized the Indians' right to "make their own laws and be ruled by
them"); Jones v. Meecham, 175 U.S. 1 (1899) (tribal law governs inheritance of reserva-
tion land); Duckhead v. Anderson, 87 Wn. 2d 649, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976) (tribal law de-
termines child custody of a tribe member on the reservation).
9. Brief of Respondent, exhibit on unnumbered page, Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. De-
partment of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977) (map of the city of Tacoma showing the
reservation boundaries).
10. Telephone Interview with William Barker, Assistant City Attorney for the City
of Tacoma, Washington (Oct. 16, 1978).
11. United States v. Washington, 496 F.2d 620, 621 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1032 (1974). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded an unpub-
lished district court decision which held that the Puyallup Indian Reservation had been
extinguished. As of this writing, no action has been taken on remand, and final judg-
ment has not been entered.
12. In Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977), the Su-
preme Court stated:
The continued existence of the Puyallup Reservation has been a matter of dis-
pute on which we express no opinion. The Ninth Circuit, relying on our decision in




the reservation's continued existence has also been raised in recent lit-
igation. 13 After reviewing the Puyallup Indian Reservation's history
and analyzing it in the context of Supreme Court decisions concerning
disestablishment, this comment concludes that the Puyallup Indian
Reservation was not disestablished when it was opened for settlement
by non-Indians.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE PUYALLUP INDIAN
RESERVATION
In 1854 the Puyallup Indian Reservation was reserved for the ex-
clusive use of the Puyallup Indians by the Treaty of Medicine
Creek.14 Article VI of this treaty provides that the President may, at
his discretion, allot the reservation and issue patents to individual In-
dians.15
Soon after the reservation was established, Congress was pressured
to open it for settlement by non-Indians. 16 Congress authorized a sur-
vey of the reservation in 1872,17 and in 1886 President Cleveland is-
sued patents on the land'8 under authority of the Treaty of Medicine
Creek and a subsequent act of Congress.' 9 These patents, however,
were not alienable by the Indian allottees, 20 and pressure to open the
v. Washington, 496 F.2d 620 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1032. That decision
predates our consideration of DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425,
and Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
Id. at 173 n. 11. The dissent in Puyallup Tribe sharply criticized the majority for failing
to recognize the holding of United States v. Washington. Id. at 183 (Brennan and Mar-
shall, JJ., dissenting).
13. See City of Tacoma v. Andrus, No. 77-1423 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 1978), reported
in 5 INDIAN L. RPTR. F-37 (1978).
14. Treaty with the Nisqually and Other Indian Tribes, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132
(Treaty of Medicine Creek). After the reservation was created, its boundaries were
twice altered by executive order. 1 C. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS-LAWS AND TREATIES
919, 922-23 (2d ed. 1904).
15. 10 Stat. at 1133.
16. The Puyallup Reservation is located on the shores of Commencement Bay in
Puget Sound. Commencement Bay is the only salt water access to the city of Tacoma.
When Tacoma was designated as the western terminus of the Northern Pacific Railroad
in 1873, the land along the bay became very valuable. See United States v. Ashton, 170
F. 509, 515 (C.C.W.D. Wash. 1909); AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE,
UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY 53 (1970).
17. Act ofMay 29, 1872, ch. 233, 17 Stat. 165, 186.
18. A total of 166 patents covering approximately 17,463 acres were issued. S.
ExEc. Doc. No. 34, 52d Cong., Ist Sess. 11-12 (1891), reprinted in part in Ross v.
Eells, 56 F. 855, 856 (C.C.D. Wash. 1893).
19. Act ofJuly 4, 1884, ch. 180, 23 Stat. 76, 88-89.
20. Article VI of the Treaty of Medicine Creek incorporates by reference the allot-
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reservation continued to mount. In 1890 Congress established a com-
mission to study the "wisdom and necessity of the disposal by the In-
dians of their interests."21 In the following year, the commission re-
ported that the reservation was a "serious detriment to the City of
Tacoma," and recommended that as much of it as possible be sold
"without injustice to the Indians." 22
In response to these recommendations, Congress passed an act in
1893 (the "Puyallup Act") establishing a commission to determine
which portions of the allotted lands on the Puyallup Indian Reserva-
tion were not required for the homes of the Indian allottees. 23 In addi-
tion, the Puyallup Act authorized the sale of the lands not needed for
Indian homes to non-Indians, on condition that no allotted land
would be sold without the written consent of the Indian allottees.
Lands not selected for sale were to be inalienable for ten years. In
1904 Congress affirmed the expiration of this inalienability period by
consenting to the sale of the remaining allotted lands. 24
Under the authority of the Puyallup Act, most of the land on the
reservation was put on the open market for sale.25 By 1904 the tribal
holdings on the reservation had dwindled from 18,000 acres to ap-
proximately thirty-six acres. 26 Soon after the opening of the reserva-
tion, the State of Washington began exercising jurisdiction over the
land. 27 Today, a major portion of the Port of Tacoma industrial dis-
trict is located within reservation boundaries. A recent estimate indi-
ment provisions of the Treaty with the Omahas. 10 Stat. at 1133. The Omaha treaty pro-
vides that patents may be issued by the President "conditioned that the tract shall not be
aliened [sic] or leased for a longer term than two years; and shall be exempt from levy,
sale or forfeiture. ... Treaty with the Omahas, March 16, 1854, 10 Stat. 1043, 1044-
45. The individual patents that were issued on the Puyallup Indian Reservation also in-
corporated the restrictions in the treaty with the Omahas. A copy of one of these patents
is printed in Ross v. Eells, 56 F. 855, 857 (C.C.D. Wash. 1893).
21. Act ofAugust 19, 1890, ch. 807, 26 Stat. 336, 354.
22. S. EXEC. Doc. No. 34, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1891).
23. Act of March 3, 1893, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 612, 633-34.
24. Act of April 28, 1904, ch. 1816, 33 Stat. 565.
25. Brief for Appellant at 7, United States v. Washington, 496 F.2d 620 (9th Cir.
1974). By Act of June 7, 1897, the 1893 Commission was reduced to one member whose
duty was to ascertain the rightful holders of the allotments and to supervise the sale of
the land. Act of June 7, 1897, ch. 3, 30 Stat. 62, 87. The land was neither homesteaded
nor sold as a large unit, but was subject to individual sales. It has been reported that be-
tween 1898 and 1914 the Puyallup Indian Commissioner executed 1,420 conveyances
of reservation land. T. Giere, Redman in a Gray Area: The Puyallup Indians II
(Spring, 1971) (unpublished report in University of Washington Law School Library).
26. Brief of Respondent at 35, Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433
U.S. 165 (1977).
27. See State v. Smokalem, 37 Wash. 91, 79 P. 603 (1905) (state exercised jurisdic-




cates a total Indian population within the reservation of 636, as com-
pared to a non-Indian population of 26,666.28 The Puyallup tribe has
retained exclusive use of about twenty-two acres of the original
reservation. 29
II. THE RESERVATION DISESTABLISHMENT TEST
The Puyallup Indian Reservation was opened for settlement pursu-
ant to a general congressional policy designed to assimilate the Indi-
ans into the mainstream of American society. 30 This policy was most
clearly expressed by the General Allotment Act of 1887,31 which es-
tablished a scheme of allotment of Indian reservations similar to that
which occurred on the Puyallup Indian Reservation 32 and declared
the Indian allottees citizens of the United States. Because the General
Allotment Act, like the Puyallup Act, did not expressly disestablish In-
dian reservations, the Supreme Court has had several opportunities to
address the question of reservation disestablishment in a context simi-
lar to that of the Puyallup Indian Reservation.
28. Brief of Respondent at 33, Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433
U.S. 165 (1977) (estimate by the State of Washington using 1970 census data).
29. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 174 (1977). In addi-
tion to tribal holdings, two or three hundred acres of the original reservation are held by
individual Indians. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITrEE, supra note 16, at 54.
30. Wilkinson & Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 139, 142-44 (1977).
31. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§
331-381 (1976)). The General Allotment Act was an attempt to settle the Indians into
homesteads, acquaint them with the practice of farming, and induce non-Indians to
move onto the reservation. The land allotted to the Indians was held in trust for a period
of twenty-five years, and it was thought that during that period the Indians would gradu-
ally adopt the white ways. Therefore, when the trust period expired, the reservation
could be abolished without injustice to the Indians. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 496
(1973). See generally Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 30.
The assimilation policy was unsuccessful and was eventually abandoned with the pas-
sage of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat.
984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-492 (1976)). The Indian Reorganization
Act discontinued the issuance of allotments, extended indefinitely the trust period on al-
lotted lands still held in trust, and restored tribal ownership to the unallotted lands
which had not been settled.
32. The allotment scheme established by the General Allotment Act differed from
the procedure followed on the Puyallup Reservation in several respects. First, the Gen-
eral Allotment Act provided for a 25-year trust period rather than the 10-year period of
inalienability established by the Puyallup Act. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat.
388. Second, negotiations under the General Allotment Act were conducted directly
with the tribe rather than with individual Indians. Id. Third, the General Allotment Act
provided for sales of only unallotted or surplus land, while the Puyallup Act provided
for sales of allotted land. Id.
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A. The Supreme Court Decisions
The Supreme Court first addressed the question of the status of an
Indian reservation in United States v. Celestine.33 In Celestine, the
state attempted to assert jurisdiction over a crime committed by an In-
dian against an Indian victim on allotted land within the Tulalip In-
dian Reservation. The Court rejected the state's claim that the issu-
ance of a government patent on the land changed its status, stating
that "when Congress has once established a reservation all tracts in-
cluded within it remain a part of the reservation until separated there-
from by Congress. 3 4
The Celestine holding was expanded in Seymour v. Super-
intendent.35 Seymour involved the Colville Indian Reservation, which
had been declared "open to settlement and entry" by a 1906 act of
Congress.3 6 In that case, the state presented two arguments to justify
its assertion of jurisdiction over a crime committed by an Indian on
reservation land owned by a non-Indian. First, the state argued that
by opening the reservation for settlement by non-Indians, Congress
had terminated the reservation, thus allowing the exercise of state ju-
risdiction over the former reservation. The Court rejected this argu-
ment because it found no language in the 1906 act "expressly vacat-
ing" the reservation.3 7 Second, the state argued that even if the entire
reservation had not been disestablished when it was opened for
settlement, the reservation status of the alienated land had been termi-
nated when it was sold to non-Indians. This argument was also re-
jected because a gradual diminution of the reservation would result in
an "impractical pattern of checkerboard jurisdiction" which could not
have been intended by Congress.38 The Court buttressed its conclu-
33. 215 U.S. 278 (1909).
34. Id. at 285.
35. 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
36. Act of March 22, 1906, ch. 1126, § 4, 34 Stat. 80, 81.
37. The Court compared the language of the 1906 act declaring the reservation
"open to settlement and entry," id., with the language in an 1892 act which had disestab-
lished the north half of the Colville Reservation by declaring it "vacated and restored to
public domain." Act of July 1, 1892, ch. 140, 27 Stat. 62, 63. Unlike the first act, the
1906 act lacked express language sufficient to disestablish the reservation. 368 U.S. at
354-55.
38. 368 U.S. at 358. If the state's contention had been sustained, reservation status
and tribal jurisdiction on the land would have been terminated as each parcel was sold.
A law enforcement officer would therefore have to carry a deed book to determine on
which portions of the land he had jurisdiction. Naturally, the deed book would have to
be routinely supplemented because jurisdiction would be constantly changing. The




sion that the reservation had not been disestablished by noting that
the Department of the Interior had continued to recognize the reser-
vation status of the land after the passage of the 1906 act.39
The question of reservation disestablishment again faced the Court
in Mattz v. Arnett.40 In that case, the state attempted to enforce its
fishing regulations against Indians fishing within the Klamath River
Indian Reservation in California. Because the language of the 1892
act opening the reservation for settlement had referred to the reserva-
tion in the past tense,41 the state argued that Congress had expressed
an intent to disestablish it.42 The Court refused to infer an intent to
terminate the reservation from the mere use of the past tense in the
settlement act and established the principle that a "congressional de-
termination to terminate must be expressed on the face of the Act or
be clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative his-
tory. ' 43 As in Seymour, the Court buttressed its conclusion by noting
that both the Department of the Interior and Congress had continued
to recognize the reservation. 44
The first case in which the Supreme Court found a clear congres-
sional intent to disestablish in the absence of words expressly
terminating a reservation was DeCoteau v. District County Court.45
In this case the federal government had negotiated an agreement with
the Sisseton-Wahpeton Tribe in which the Indians agreed to "cede,
sell, relinquish, and convey to the United States all their claim, right,
title and interest" in all the unallotted lands on the Lake Traverse In-
dian Reservation in South Dakota in exchange for a "sum certain"
sale price.46 Congress ratified this agreement and opened the reserva-
tion for settlement.47
Although the Court recognized that ambiguities in congressional
language are to be resolved in favor of the Indians,48 it found that the
39. Id. at 357.
40. 412 U.S. 481 (1973).
41. Act of June 17, 1892, ch. 120, 27 Stat. 52. See note 64 infra for an excerpt of the
language of the act.
42. As further evidence of congressional intent, the state pointed to language in pre-
vious drafts of the act which, if enacted, would have expressly terminated the
reservation. The Court found the failure to enact more explicit legislation to be evi-
dence of congressional intent not to terminate the reservation. 412 U.S.!at. 503-04..
43. Id. at 505.
44. Id.
45. 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
46. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 26, 26 Stat. 989, 1036.
47. Id. § 20, 26 Stat. at 1029.
48. 420 U.S. at 444, 447. The rule that ambiguities are to be construed in favor of
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language "cede, surrender, grant and convey" -learly indicated that
Congress intended to terminate the reservation status of the ceded
land. 49 The Court reinforced its conclusion by noting that the Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs had ceased to recognize the reservation
status of the ceded land.50
The DeCoteau Court distinguished Mattz and Seymour on the
grounds that those cases did not involve a bilateral agreement and a
sum certain sale price.51 This distinction was subsequently tested in
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip.52 In Rosebud, Congress had, by sepa-
rate legislative acts, made three purchases of large tracts of the Rose-
bud Indian Reservation in South Dakota. Although the first two pur-
chases were preceded by negotiations with the tribe, no binding
agreement was obtained. 53 The third purchase was made without ne-
the Indians is a canon of construction applicable to interpreting all legislation affecting
the Indians. See, e.g., McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n. 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973)
(quoting Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930)) ("Doubtful expressions are to be
resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are the wards of the nation, de-
pendent upon its protection and good faith"); United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 599
(1916) ("According to a familiar rule, legislation affecting the Indians is to be construed
in their interest"). This rule of construction was affirmed in its application to reserva-
tion disestablishment by Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 586-88 (1977).
49. A majority of the Court found the language of cession in the 1891 act to be "pre-
cisely suited" to reservation disestablishment. 420 U.S. at 445. Three justices dissented
on the ground that the 1891 act did not contain "a word to suggest that the boundaries of
the reservation were altered." Id. at 461 (Douglas, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
50. The Court noted that the maps published by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs
after 1908 labeled the ceded area as an "open" or "former" reservation. Id. at 442.
51. Id.at447-49.
52. 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
53. Article 12 of the treaty with the Rosebud Sioux Tribe provided that no cession
of any part of the reservation would be valid without the written approval of three-
fourths of the adult male Indians on the reservation. Treaty with the Sioux Indians, art.
12, April 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635. The United States began negotiations for the purchase
of part of the reservation near the turn of the century, and in 1901, by written agree-
ment, three-fourths of the adult male Indians agreed to "cede, surrender, grant, and con-
vey" a particularly described portion of the reservation in exchange for a sum certain
sale price of $2.50 per acre. 430 U.S. at 591 n.8 (reprinting the operative language of the
agreement). Instead of ratifying this agreement, Congress altered the terms of payment
and returned it to the Indians for their approval.
An amended agreement was obtained which lacked the signatures of the required
three-fourths majority. Nevertheless, Congress ratified this agreement, incorporating
the cession language verbatim and opening the Gregory County portion of the Rosebud
Indian Reservation for settlement in 1904. Act of April 23, 1904, ch. 1484, 33 Stat. 254.
A second portion of the reservation was purchased and opened for settlement in




gotiations with the tribe.54 Only the language of the act authorizing
the first purchase incorporated words of cession,55 and the act author-
izing the third purchase did not even set a sale price.56
The Rosebud Tribe argued that the disestablishment of an Indian
reservation required a clear congressional intent, and that in the ab-
sence of express language such intent could be inferred only when
there was a bilateral agreement and a sum certain sale price. Reject-
ing the tribe's argument, the Court found the required intent in the
cession language of the first act, and concluded that the subsequent
acts were passed with a similar intent.57 Thus, it was held that the res-
ervation status of the land in all three parcels had been terminated.
This conclusion was further supported on the grounds that the Presi-
dent had interpreted the acts as diminishing the reservation,5 8 and
that the state had assumed "unquestioned jurisdiction" over the land
since the passage of the acts.59
ations with the tribe which culminated in an agreement signed by fewer than the requi-
site three-fourths majority.
54. The third purchase occurred in 1910. Act of May 30, 1910, ch. 260, 36 Stat. 448.
Instead of negotiating an agreement with the tribe, Congress relied upon a report from
the Indian agent which stated that tribal sentiment for opening the third portion of the
reservation was "practically unanimous." 430 U.S. at 610.
55. The 1904 act stated, "The said Indians . . . for the consideration hereinafter
named, do hereby cede, surrender, grant, and convey to the United States all their
claim, right, title, and interest in and to all that part of the Rosebud Indian Reservation
now remaining unallotted, situated within the boundaries of Gregory County, South
Dakota." Act of April 23, 1904, ch. 1484, 33 Stat. 254, 254. In contrast, the 1907 and
1910 acts only provided "[t] hat the land shall be disposed of. . . under the general pro-
visions of the homestead and townsite laws of the United States, and shall be opened to
settlement and entry by proclamation of the President." Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2536,
§ 2, 34 Stat. 1230, 1230; Act of May 30, 1910, ch. 260, § 2, 36 Stat. 448, 449. The opera-
tive language of these latter purchases is very similar to that examined by the Court in
Seymour. See text accompanying notes 35 & 36 supra.
56. Instead of establishing a sum certain sale price, the 1910 act provided that the
consideration for the sale would be "fixed by appraisement." Act of May 30, 1910, ch.
260, § 4, 36 Stat. 448, 450.
57. 430 U.S. at 606.
58. The Court quoted part of a presidential proclamation which it interpreted as
"an unambiguous, contemporaneous, statement, by the Nation's Chief Executive, of a
perceived disestablishment." Id. at 602-03.
59. Id. at 598 n.20, 603-04. Three justices dissented in Rosebud on the grounds that
the cession language in the 1904 act was ambiguous under the circumstances of that sale
and therefore should be construed in favor of the Indians. Furthermore, the dissent
noted that there was no cession language in the 1907 and 1910 acts, thereby refuting the
majority's contention that those acts evidenced a clear congressional intent to disestab-
lish. Id. at 615 (Marshall, Brennan, & Stewart, JJ., dissenting). See notes 42 & 43 and
accompanying text supra (discussion of the test requiring a clear congressional intent).
661
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B. The Current Statement of the Disestablishment Test
The foregoing cases indicate that the controlling determination in a
disestablishment inquiry is congressional intent. Congressional intent
to disestablish must be expressly stated on the face of a statute or be
clear from the legislative history and circumstances surrounding the
passage of the act. As evidence of congressional intent, the Court will
consider the operative language of the statute, the legislative history
of the act, subsequent agency and congressional recognition of the
reservation, and the practical effects of disestablishment. Therefore, a
determination whether the Puyallup Indian Reservation exists must
be made in light of these considerations.
III. APPLICATION OF THE DISESTABLISHMENT TEST
TO THE PUYALLUP INDIAN RESERVATION
A. Operative Language
When the central purpose of a statute is to disestablish an Indian
reservation, Congress will state that purpose expressly in the operative
language of the act.60 Therefore, when congressional legislation fails
expressly to address the disestablishment issue, either that issue was
not the central purpose of the statute, or it failed to command major-
ity support in Congress. In either case, any inference of a congres-
sional intent to disestablish is weak.
The Puyallup Act contains no language expressly terminating the
reservation, 61 and therefore a presumption against disestablishment is
raised.62 However, as stated in DeCoteau, this presumption is rebut-
ted by language of cession by which the Indians relinquish and convey
their interest in the land.63 There is no language of cession in the Puy-
60. Congress has terminated reservations in the past by the use of express words
such as "discontinued," Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 248, 15 Stat. 198, 221, "vacated and
restored to public domain," Act of July 1, 1892, ch. 140, § 1, 27 Stat. 62, 63, and "abol-
ished," Act of April 21, 1904, ch. 1402, 33 Stat. 189, 218. See also Mattz, 412 U.S. at
504 n.22.
61. See note 64 infra (quoting the Puyallap Act).
62. In Mattz, the absence of express language of termination was considered evi-
dence of a congressional intent not to terminate. See note 42 supra.
63. See notes 45-49 and accompanying text supra. In contrast to language of ces-
sion, language of declaration (language by which Congress merely declares a
reservation to be open for settlement and entry) is not sufficient to disestablish a reser-




allup Act. Instead, the Act merely provides for the sale of the land on
the reservation for the benefit of the Indian allottees. This language
opens the reservation for settlement, but is not sufficient to rebut the
presumption against an intent to disestablish. 64
Another significant aspect of the operative language of the Puyal-
lup Act is that it expressly provides that a portion of the reservation is
to be retained by the Indians and not opened for settlement.65 There-
fore, if the Act's language expresses an intent to disestablish, it does so
in reference to only a part and not to all of the reservation. Other stat-
utes which have been construed as disestablishing a part of a
reservation have always contained an exact description of the portion
of the land which is to lose its reservation status.66 The operative lan-
64. The Puyallup Act provides:
That the President of the United States is hereby authorized immediately after
the passage of this act to appoint a commission... to select and appraise such por-
tions of the allotted lands as are not required for homes for the Indian alotees [sic]
.... And if the Secretary of the Interior shall approve the selections and appraise-
ments made by said commission, the allotted lands so selected shall be sold for the
benefit of the allottees.
Act of March 3, 1893, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 612, 633. This language is similar to that used in
the act authorizing the sale of the Klamath River Reservation: "That all the lands em-
braced in what was Klamath River Reservation ... are hereby declared to be subject to
settlement, entry, and purchase under the laws of the United States granting homestead
rights and authorizing the sale of mineral, stone, and timber lands . . . ." Act of June 17,
1892, ch. 120, 27 Stat. 52, 52. The Klamath River Reservation was held not to be
disestablished in Mattz.
Compare the language of the 1904 act which was held in Rosebud to terminate part of
the Rosebud Indian Reservation:
The said Indians belonging on the Rosebud Reservation, South Dakota, for the
consideration hereinafter named, do hereby cede, surrender, grant, and convey to
the United States all their claim, right, title, and interest in and to all that part of
the Rosebud Indian Reservation now remaining unallotted, situated within the
boundaries of Gregory County, South Dakota, described more particularly as fol-
lows: [description of the ceded land].
Act of April 23, 1904, ch. 1484, 33 Stat. 254, 254.
65. The Puyallup Act expressly provides that "the Indian allottees shall not have
power of alienation of the allotted lands not selected for sale by said Commission for a
period often years .... Act of March 3, 1893, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 612, 633.
66. Where the entire reservation is to be disestablished, Congress will not provide a
legal description since the boundaries are already well established. See, for example, the
language of the agreement with the Sisseton-Wahpeton Tribe which was incorporated by
reference into the 1891 act disestablishing the Lake Traverse Reservation in South Da-
kota. That agreement states: "The Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of Dakota or Sioux In-
dians hereby cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the United States all their claim, right,
title, and interest in and to all the unallotted lands within the limits of the reserva-
tion .. "Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 26,26 Stat. 989, 1036. Where only a part of
the reservation is to be disestablished, Congress normally provides an exact description
of the ceded land. See, e.g., Act of April 23, 1904, ch. 1484,33 Stat. 254, 254 (part of the
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guage of the Puyallup Act contains no such description, 67 suggesting
that Congress did not intend to disestablish the reservation status of
the land sold under its provisions.
B. Legislative History
The Supreme Court cases have highlighted two familiar patterns in
the legislative history of settlement acts which provide evidence of a
congressional intent to disestablish. The first pattern is exemplified by
Mattz and consists of a series of legislative attempts to disestablish a
reservation followed by the passage of an act which merely opens the
reservation for settlement. This "clear retreat" from previous attempts
to vacate the reservation is evidence that Congress did not intend to
disestablish the reservation. 68 The second pattern is exemplified by
the bilateral agreement of DeCoteau. Although a binding agreement
is not essential to finding congressional intent to disestablish, when
such an agreement exists it indicates "an unmistakable baseline pur-
pose of disestablishment." 69
The legislative history of the Puyallup Act does not fall into either
pattern. It does, however, offer some evidence of congressional intent
by negative implication. Every statute construed by the Supreme
Court as terminating reservation status which does not contain ex-
press language of disestablishment either has been preceded by nego-
tiations with the tribe or has been part of a series of purchases initially
preceded by negotiations with the tribe.70 The sale of the Puyallup In-
language of this act is reproduced in note 64 supra); Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2536, § 2.
34 Stat. 1230, 1230; Act of May 30, 1910, ch. 260, § 2, 36 Stat. 448, 448-49.
67. The portion of the Puyallup Indian Reservation to be sold is not described ei-
ther by location or amount. See note 64 supra for an excerpt from the Puyallup Act. The
Act authorizes the appointment of a commission to determine which part of the
reservation could be sold. Thus, to construe the Act as an exercise of the congressional
power to disestablish the reservation would be to find an unprecedented delegation of
that power. It is highly unlikely that Congress intended such a delegation.
68. Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 598-99 n.20 (quoting DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 448).
69. Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 592.
70. It is probably the existence of negotiations and not varying congressional intent
which is most responsible for the differences in operative language of the various settle-
ment acts. When the settlement act has been preceded by an agreement with the Indians,
the cession language of the initial agreement has been incorporated into the act. See
Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 597. The use of this language may have been no more than a sim-
ple expedient, or possibly a justification for what would have occurred anyway.
In all cases, the congressional intent was probably the same. The reservations had be-




dian Reservation was not preceded by negotiations with the tribe. The
Puyallup Act required only the consent of individual Indian allottees
before their land was sold.7 ' Therefore, the absence of both a bilateral
agreement and negotiations with the tribe is, by negative implication,
evidence that Congress did not intend to disestablish the Puyallup
Indian Reservation.72
C. Subsequent Congressional and Agency Recognition
The Supreme Court has consistently looked to congressional and
federal agency recognition of a reservation after its opening as evi-
dence of congressional intent in the settlement act.73 When Congress
or the Department of Interior continues to recognize reservation sta-
tus, the Court is more likely to infer a congressional intent to retain
the reservation. Several congressional and agency documents have
recognized the existence of the Puyallup Indian Reservation since the
passage of the Puyallup Act.7 4 These documents provide evidence that
Congress did not intend to disestablish the reservation.
reservations and therefore adopted a policy of assimilating the Indians into the
mainstream of American society. See notes 30-31 and accompanying text supra. The
pressures for opening the various reservations were so recurrent that the Court has
dubbed them "familiar forces." Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 590(,quoting DeCoteau, 420U.S.
at 43 1).
It is therefore more reasonable to attribute the differences in operative language to
the existence of an agreement with the Indians than to a difference in congressional in-
tent. The Rosebud Court implicitly recognized this when it held that the congressional
intent in all three acts disestablishing parts of the Rosebud Reservation was the same al-
though the operative language and circumstances surrounding these three acts were
quite different. See notes 53-59 and accompanying text supra.
71. Act of March 3, 1893, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 612, 633-34, See also note 25 and ac-
companying text supra.
72. Although the sale of the reservation was preceded by the Treaty of Medicine
Creek, any argument that would substitute that treaty for the bilateral agreement of De-
Coteau or the negotiations of Rosebud must fail because the treaty, while providing for
the allotment of the reservation, does not provide for the sale of the allotted lands to
non-Indians. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
73. See notes 39, 44, 50, 58, & 59 and accompanying text supra.
74. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 2503, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 52, 550, 560, 933-34, 1092,
1286, 1306-07 (1952); Office of the Regional Solicitor, Portland, Ore., Dep't of Inte-
rior, Memorandum Opinion (August 13, 1971) (copy on file with Washington Law Re-
view); Constitution and Bylaws of the Puyallup Tribe of the Puyallup Reservation of the
State of Washington (April 11, 1936) (as amended) (approved by Harold L. Ickes, Sec-
retary of the Interior, May 13, 1936) (copy on file wih Washington Law Review).
After considering the evidence of congressional and agency recognition of the
Puyallup Indian Reservation, the Ninth Circuit stated:
Nor can we discern a significant variance between the historical background, in-
cluding the continuing congressional and agency recognition, of the Klamath River
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Nevertheless, in several cases the State of Washington has argued
that while Congress has made repeated statutory references to the Puy-
allup Tribe, no such references have been made to the Puyallup In-
dian Reservation. 75 This argument overlooks substantial evidence of
congressional and agency recognition, but even if this evidence were
not available, the state's argument would not provide an adequate
basis to conclude that Congress intended to disestablish the reserva-
tion. To find such an intent, the Court has relied only upon affirma-
tive acts, such as designation of the land as a "former reservation" on
the Bureau of Indian Affairs maps, or declarations by the President
that the reservation had been terminated.76 Instead of relying upon af-
firmative acts, the state relies only upon congressional inaction to sup-
port its argument. At most, this lack of congressional action indicates
that the reservation status of the land has remained unchanged since
the opening of the reservation.
The State of Washington has also argued that any ambiguity in the
history of the congressional and agency recognition of the Puyallup
Indian Reservation is clarified by the absence of a federal challenge to
the state's exercise of jurisdiction on the reservation. 77 This position
was supported by the Rosebud Court when it stated that the state's ex-
ercise of "unquestioned jurisdiction" is evidence of a congressional in-
tent to disestablish.78 However, this criterion cannot, by itself, support
an inference of a congressional intent to disestablish since it is capable
of multiple meanings. For example, it may only indicate that the Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs was without the manpower to exercise
jurisdiction over the reservation or that Congress was unaware of the
state's exercise of jurisdiction. Furthermore, the state's exercise of ju-
risdiction on the Puyallup Indian Reservation did face a serious fed-
eral challenge in 1974,79 and therefore has not gone "unquestioned."
Reservation [which was held not to be disestablished] involved in Mattz and the
historical background and continuing recognition of the questioned Puyallup Res-
ervation. For that matter, the historical background and continuing congressional
and agency recognition of the Puyallups would appear to be substantially more im-
pressive than that of the Klamaths.
United States v. Washington, 496 F.2d 620, 620-21 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1032 (1974).
75. Brief of Respondent at 38-41, Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game,
433 U.S. 165 (1977); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13-14, United States v. Washing-
ton, 496 F.2d 620 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1032 (1974).
76. See notes 50 & 58 and accompanying text supra.
77. Brief of Respondent at 32, Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433
U.S. 165 (1977); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, United States v. Washington, 496
F.2d 620 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1032 (1974).
78. 430 U.S. at 598 n.20, 603-04.




D. Practical Effect of Termination
The final criterion to be examined by the Court as evidence of con-
gressional intent to disestablish is the practical effect of termination.
In examining such effects, the Court will not weigh the merits of
retaining the reservation in light of modern circumstances, but instead
will consider only the practical consequences which reflect the con-
gressional intent at the time the reservation was opened for settle-
ment.80 The most significant practical effect of disestablishment
which the Court will consider is the termination of reservation bound-
aries-the jurisdictional line between the tribe and the state. If the
Puyallup Act is construed as disestablishing the reservation, the termi-
nation of the reservation status must have occurred as the land was
sold, because the Puyallup Act, while expressly preserving part of the
reservation, does not describe what land was to lose reservation sta-
tus.81 Such a termination would create an "impractical pattern of
checkerboard jurisdiction" which would change every time a piece of
land was sold to a non-Indian. This result was condemned in Sey-
mour.
8 2
The amount of the reservation that would be disestablished by a
statute will also be considered by the Court when determining if Con-
gress intended to disestablish a reservation. When a reservation is
merely diminished rather than completely destroyed, the Court is
more likely to infer a congressional intent to disestablish. 83 Constru-
ing the Puyallup Act as disestablishing the reservation would result in
a virtual extinguishment of the reservation, since by 1904 the tribal
holdings on the reservation had been reduced to only about thirty-six
1032 (1974).
80. The Court's deferral to congressional judgment on the relative merits of retain-
ing an Indian reservation is proper because the power to disestablish Indian reserva-
tions lies with Congress and not the Court. See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
A close analogy to the Puyallup situation can be seen in Seymour v. Superintendent,
368 U.S. 351 (1962). In that case, the state attempted to assert jurisdiction over a crime
committed by an Indian in the town of Omak, Washington. Rather than consider the
modern consequences to the town of Omak, the Court focused on the practical effect of
disestablishment at the time the reservation was opened. Under the Court's reasoning, it
would have made no difference if today the town were owned entirely by non-Indians,
because at the time the land was being sold there would have been an impractical pat-
tern of jurisdiction which Congress could never have intended. Id. at 358-59. The rea-
soning in Seymour is consistent with the subsequent Supreme Court cases on reserva-
tion disestablishment, since none of the latter cases has examined the modern
consequences of the reservation status.
81. See notes 66 & 67 and accompanying text supra.
82. See note 38 supra.
83. Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 598-99 n.20.
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acres. 84 Therefore, a higher burden of proof will be required before
the Court will infer a congressional intent to disestablish the Puyallup
Indian Reservation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Puyallup Indian Reservation was opened for settlement by
non-Indians but was never expressly disestablished. Under such cir-
cumstances, a court must look at the congressional intent of the settle-
ment act to determine whether Congress intended to terminate the
reservation. Congressional intent is determined by examining the op-
erative language of the act, the legislative history of the act, subse-
quent congressional and agency recognition of the reservation, and
the practical effect of termination.
The principal arguments in favor of inferring termination of the
Puyallup Indian Reservation are based upon the state's exercise of ju-
risdiction on the reservation since its opening 85 and upon the potential
hardships imposed upon the city of Tacoma by the existence of a res-
ervation. 86 Although these arguments express valid concerns, they do
not reflect Congress' intent when it passed the Puyallup Act in 1893
and should not be used by a court as a basis for determining that the
reservation was disestablished. The problems posed are not without a
remedy because Congress can, if necessary, expressly disestablish the
Puyallup Indian Reservation and provide compensation for its taking
now.
The operative language and the circumstances surrounding the pas-
sage of the Puyallup Act provide little or no evidence of a
congressional intent to disestablish the reservation. Therefore, a chal-
lenge of the reservation's status can, at best, show that the congres-
sional intent of the Puyallup Act is ambiguous. In such a case, ambi-
guity should be construed in favor of the Indians.
Richard M. Slagle
84. Brief of Respondent at 35, Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433
U.S. 165 (1977).
85. See note 77 and accompanying text supra.
86. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
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